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ABSTRACT 
This essay considers the relationship between the work of contemporary artist Torsten 
Lauschmann and themes in a growing area of research:  philosophy of technology.  Themes 
considered include relations between technology and contemporary urban dwelling, 
technology and the “everyday,” and Heidegger’s problematic but canonical understanding of 
technology not as a set of “mere means” but as a “way of revealing.”  I argue that 
Lauschmann’s art renders these themes relevant for our increasingly technologically 
mediated forms of everyday experience by engaging in a paradoxical practice of creating 
what McLuhan called “anti-environments.”  
Part One relates Lauschmann’s art to three concepts surfacing in McLuhan’s late work:  
“figure,” “ground,” and “anti-environment.”  Part Two relates Lauschmann’s art to Merleau-
Ponty’s critique of photography in terms of the ontology of dynamic movement.  Part Three 
relates Lauschmann’s art to Heidegger, implying a form of “affective critique” that — by 
questioning the environmental conditions that constitute works of art — points beyond 
vexed aspects of Heidegger’s approach, such as its apparent pessimism and tendency to 
homogenize disparate technologies.  The essay’s broader argument is that Lauschmann’s art, 
like the philosophical reflections to which it is related, is engaged in a practice of challenging 
settled common-sense notions regarding technologically mediated experience.  
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Introduction.  Startling Reaction 
 
Torsten Lauschmann is a German-born artist working in Glasgow, Scotland.  
Perhaps most notorious for the 2006 Internet hoax World Jump Day, his 
exhibition venues include Art Basel Miami Beach (Miami), the Institute of 
Contemporary Arts (London), Arnolfini (Bristol), and the Galerie Pascal 
Vanhoecke (Paris).1  Lauschmann is the recipient of numerous prizes, 
including the inaugural Margaret Tait award at the 2010 Glasgow Film 
Festival and a Vital Spark commission from Creative Scotland in 2011 as well 
as shortlistings for the 2011 Jarman award and the 2012 Samsung Art Plus 
Prize.2  His work has in recent years been a critical focus for important voices 
on the British art scene, including Sean Cubitt and Esther Leslie.3
Over the course of Lauschmann’s career, his art practice has 
incorporated diverse media from video, sound, and computer programming 
to photography, installation, oil painting, and print.  As this essay aims to 
demonstrate, however, one of the consistent themes guiding Lauschmann’s 
work is a fascination with the human relationship with technology.  
Lauschmann’s art draws attention to paradoxical dimensions of this 
relationship, where paradox is understood in the etymological sense of “para-
doxa" or that which is “against common sense.”  By “common sense,” I have in 
mind the ancient Greek sense of “doxa” as “common belief” or “opinion.”
 
4  My 
argument in this essay is that Lauschmann’s art subverts common sense 
beliefs and opinions on what technology is, how it functions, and where it 
might be leading us.  It does so, I argue, by developing forms of what I call 
“anti-environments” and “affective critique.”  By working through reflections 
from three canonical figures in the history of philosophy of technology — 
Marshall McLuhan, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Martin Heidegger — the 
essay builds the case that Lauschmann’s art opens a space for thoroughgoing 
aesthetic reflection on the roles that technologies have in mediating 
contemporary existence.  To paraphrase the title of a 2011-2012 exhibition by 
Lauschmann:  by “startling reaction” out of the engrained norms, beliefs, and 
opinions of common sense, his art forces the normally hidden technological 
ground on which so much of contemporary experience stands to become 
apparent.  It does this, I contend, not to moralize on how we should use 
technologies but rather to affectively open more wide-ranging philosophical 
issues that follow from the technological mediation of contemporary ways of 
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life.  Philosophy of technology is a growing and diverse field of research that 
sets out to address the epistemological, ontological, and ethico-political 
implications of the technological mediation of contemporary ways of life, 
whether human or nonhuman.  Approaches ranged under this rubric include 
hermeneutical, phenomenological, object-oriented, and constructivist 
modes of inquiry and have produced such varied theories as Actor-Network 
Theory, Cyborg Theory, and Critical Theory of Technology.5
The essay comprises three main parts.  In Part One, I relate 
Lauschmann’s art to McLuhan’s concepts of “figure,” “ground,” and “anti-
environment.”  I argue that Lauschmann’s art can be viewed as a paradoxical 
gesture of “figuring” anti-environments that call into question our common 
sense of how experience is constituted in technologically mediated 
situations.  In Part Two, I relate Lauschmann’s 2011 work Before the Revolution 
to Merleau-Ponty’s critique of photography in L’Oeil et l’esprit — both of which 
draw upon Gericault’s 1821 painting The Derby at Epsom.  Here I argue that by 
problematizing a specifically photographic common sense of this painting, 
both Lauschmann’s art practice and Merleau-Ponty’s remarks can be viewed 
as highly specific and critical gestures of “figuring.”  In Part Three, I consider 
the gesture of “figuring” in broader terms in relation to Heidegger’s canonical 
but problematic philosophy of technology.  Lauschmann’s art involves a form 
of “affective critique” that points beyond Heidegger’s apparent pessimism 
and his tendency to homogenize disparate technologies into an essentialist 
understanding of “Technology.”  I argue that by staging dramatic gestures of 
figuring in which disparate technologies and technologically mediated 
situations collide, Lauschmann’s art may provide an affective critique and 
supplement to the Heideggerian approach to the philosophy of technology.  
  The field provides 
a complementary background for an investigation of Lauschmann’s work, I 
argue, because it undertakes to explore conceptually what he undertakes to 
explore affectively.  
To conclude, I argue that Lauschmann’s gesture of figuring, like the 
three philosophical reflections to which this essay relates it, can be viewed as 
a timely affirmation of the passion for paradox against temptations to fall 
into uncritical forms of technologically-mediated “common sense.”  
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1. Figure and ground.  McLuhan  
 
From October 2011 to August 2012, Lauschmann exhibited a collection of 
works entitled Startle Reaction at venues including Dundee Contemporary 
Arts (Dundee, Scotland), the AV Festival (Newcastle, England), and the John 
Hansard Gallery (Southampton, England).  It was his largest solo exhibition to 
date.  At the head of the gallery notes for Startle Reaction, an epithet from 
Marshall McLuhan’s book War and Peace in the Global Village (1968) read:  “We 
are all robots when uncritically involved with our technologies.”6
That Lauschmann cites a figure like McLuhan at all indicates that 
there are links to be explored between his art and philosophical reflections on 
technology.  It may also indicate something profound about the aims and 
methods of Lauschmann’s practice.  A stated aim of Startle Reaction was to 
sidestep “the tension that exists between optimistic and skeptical attitudes 
towards technology.”
  
7
A closer look at McLuhan’s work might help to clarify this aspect of 
Lauschmann’s practice.  Here, for example, is McLuhan appropriating Gestalt 
psychology’s distinction between “figure” and “ground” at the beginning of 
Laws of Media (1988): 
  This does not mean that Lauschmann aims at 
something anodyne or uncontroversial; rather, it bespeaks a desire to 
cultivate a more nuanced critical awareness.  Instead of seeking to induce 
crude forms of optimism or pessimism regarding the “destiny” towards which 
a deterministic conception of “Technology” might be leading us, perhaps 
what Lauschmann’s art aims at is the construction of spaces in which critical 
distance can be taken on our immersion in technologically mediated 
environments and the ways in which these environments — by virtue of the 
differences between them — contribute to the diverse character of 
contemporary experience.  
 
All situations comprise an area of attention (figure) and a very much larger 
area of inattention (ground).  The two continually coerce and play with each 
other across a common outline or boundary or interval that serves to define 
both simultaneously … Figures rise out of, and recede back into, ground, 
which … comprises all other available figures at once.  For example, at a 
lecture, attention will shift from the speaker’s words to his gestures, to the 
hum of the lights or to street sounds, to the feel of the chair or to a memory or 
association or smell.  Each new figure in turn displaces the others into ground 
… The study of ground “on its own terms” is virtually impossible; by definition 
it is at any moment environmental and subliminal.  The only possible strategy 
for such study entails constructing an anti-environment:  such is the normal 
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activity of the artist, the only person in our culture whose whole business has 
been the retraining and updating of sensibility.8
  
 
In its concerns with attention, inattention, and, broadly speaking, 
“intentionality,” this extract implicitly shows McLuhan at his most 
“phenomenological.”  That said, he goes beyond phenomenology in his 
concept of the “anti-environment,” which has several political and aesthetic 
connotations.9
“Figure” is that to which we are attentive in a situation, “ground” that 
to which we are inattentive.  In McLuhan’s example, “figure” may constitute 
the words or gestures of a lecturer or “a memory or association.”  The key 
point of his discussion, however, is that whenever a figure becomes the focus 
of attention, it “displaces the others into ground”:  into a state of latency or 
potentiality.  There is more to this dynamic, however, than the straightforward 
replacement of one figure by another.  Equally important is the role that 
displaced potential figures play in conditioning awareness of whatever 
emerges to replace them as figure.  In order for awareness of any figure to be 
possible at all, displaced potential figures must feature as “ground”:  as 
precisely that to which we are inattentive.  
  Indeed, if we examine McLuhan’s terminology, we may come 
to view Lauschmann’s art as a way of constructing “anti-environments.”  
To consider how this might relate to Lauschmann’s work, we must 
think through the relation between figure and ground in technologically 
mediated situations.  A situation is technologically mediated if technologies 
play a necessary role in constituting the character of intentions and behaviors 
that take place within the situation.  In McLuhan’s example, a “technologically 
mediated situation” could be a lecture that uses PowerPoint or a microphone.  
Other examples include the situation of an office where the workforce is 
dependent on a computer network, that of rail passengers dependent on a 
train’s engine, or that of the audience in a cinema whose experience of the 
cinema qua cinema is dependent on the smooth functioning of the projector 
and screen.  
What is striking about such situations is that the technologies 
involved nearly always feature as part of their “ground,” rarely as “figure.”  In 
an office, the larger part of the workforce is expected to attend to content 
exchanged through the network, not to the network itself:  to the “message,” 
not the “medium,” in McLuhan’s more famous terms.10  On a train, passengers 
are expected to attend either to the itinerary of their journey or to sanctioned 
forms of distraction (books, food, smartphones, or daydreams), not to the 
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workings of the engine itself.  In a cinema, the audience is expected to attend 
to the film, not to the projector or screen qua “projector” or “screen.”  
Such is the normal state of technologically mediated situations.  In 
contrast,  Lauschmann’s art establishes “anti-environments” that force 
technologies and their normally hidden roles to become “figures.”  Of itself, 
such a contention may seem hackneyed in the wake of Gestalt psychology, 
phenomenology, and, indeed, McLuhan’s work; attention to how it works in 
Lauschmann’s art, however, reveals many subtleties in his approach. 
Consider for example the 2003 work “Misshapen Pearl.”11  An eight-
minute video voiced by the artist, it is, as Lauschmann puts it, a reflection on 
“the streetlamp’s function in our consumer society.”12
 
  At the outset, he reads 
from Vilém Flusser:  
What is a streetlamp?  I only pay her my attention if she bugs me, or if her 
light is too intense, or defective, or missing, or like now, if I give her my 
attention by breaking through the accepted everyday.  In every other 
situation the streetlamp is for me just part of that disrespected environment, 
which I take for granted and which was created to be disrespected.13
 
   
The point is that streetlamps are technologies that are intended to feature in 
the “ground” of contemporary existence:  they are not that to which one is 
supposed to be attentive but something that contemporary urban existence 
conditions us to “take for granted.”  In “Misshapen Pearl,” this normal situation 
is recognized but immediately transgressed by making the streetlamp the 
figure.  Indeed, the transgression is marked in precise terms:  it occurs when 
Lauschmann states “or like now, if I give her [the streetlamp] my attention.”  
Here, the word “now,” a veritable speech act, inaugurates a shift from what 
Lauschmann calls the “accepted everyday” towards immersion into the 
artwork as a form of “anti-environment.”  First, it forces recognition of the 
streetlamp’s normally subliminal role within the limits of the “accepted 
everyday.”  Second, it commands that these limits be “broken through” by the 
requested act of attention.  “Misshapen Pearl” sustains this “breaking 
through” by constructing a collage of found and bespoke filmic content, 
juxtaposed with an incongruous jazz soundtrack and the drawl of 
Lauschmann’s continuing voiceover:  images from across the globe draw 
attention to the taken-for-granted ubiquity of street lighting in contemporary 
city spaces, but Lauschmann’s editing is sufficiently dexterous to also 
highlight cultural specificities (e.g., the neon signs of London’s China Town 
versus a dimly-lit Glasgow road crossing).  Slowed-down and speeded-up 
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advertisements clash with Lauschmann’s plaintive reflections on the nature 
of the mind-body relation.  And towards the end, the music changes and 
becomes more insistent, and the streetlamp’s function as a metonym for 
broader clashes between concepts of “culture” and “nature” becomes more 
explicit in Lauschmann’s remarks.    
The “everyday” perspective maintains that a streetlamp is too trivial a 
thing to merit attention.  It is for precisely this reason, however, that it works 
as a focus for Lauschmann.  By turning the streetlamp into figure, “Misshapen 
Pearl” draws attention to the ubiquity of a technologically mediated situation 
that can nevertheless be highly specific in terms of how it constitutes 
contemporary urban experiences.  The viewer is invited to reflect on the 
extent to which a city’s ubiquitous lights condition specific patterns of 
behavior:  like flames to a moth, these lights can channel nocturnal 
movement; like artificial suns, they can turn night to day, setting new rhythms 
for play, work, and rest; like guard rails on a bridge, they can be something 
that one takes for granted precisely until they are not there. 
 
    
Figure 1.  Misshapen Pearl (T. Lauschmann, 2003) 
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Figure 2.  Self-Portrait as a Pataphysical Object (T. Lauschmann, 2006) 
Suppose we call this gesture of making a technology emerge from its 
ground one of “figuring” and undertake to seek further examples of its 
function in Lauschmann’s art.  In Self-Portrait as a Pataphysical Object (2006), a 
chandelier made of cables and audio adaptors harbors a tiny light source.14  
Here, the relation of “figuring” is reversible:  if we apprehend the cabling as 
figure, this calls attention to functional and material aspects of the electrical 
process that are normally deeply “grounded” in our use of electrical 
appliances.  On the other hand, if we apprehend the light source as figure, this 
will provoke different reflections.  The work has been read, for example, as a 
comment on the precarious nature of man’s “soul” in a technologically 
mediated world, but it might equally be viewed in a more ecological sense, 
perhaps as denoting the sheer scale of the technological infrastructure (the 
cabling as ground) that stands behind even the smallest use of electricity (the 
light as figure).15 
On Technological Ground 
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In another piece, The Coy Lover (2011), a pianola appears to be forced 
into action by the snow machine suspended above it in order to then be 
caressed by the resultant flakes.16  Here, a relation of figuring emerges 
between this surreal juxtaposition and the compositions Lauschmann has 
programmed the pianola to play.  Normally, situations involving musical 
instruments, whether considered from the perspective of the musicians or 
the audience, seem to dictate that the compositions feature as “figure” while 
the instruments feature as “ground.”  The Coy Lover complicates this picture 
considerably.  First, Lauschmann’s compositions are recordings emitted by an 
instrument (the pianola) that was designed to maintain the illusion of live 
performance, blurring the distinction between recording and performance 
and inviting the viewer to reflect on the forms of technological mediation 
involved in both situations.  Second, Lauschmann’s compositions are 
juxtaposed with the drone of the snow machine.  Is this work therefore an 
allegory of technology’s tendency to generate “noise” and “interference” — 
which we hear whenever the snow machine starts, claiming the position of 
“figure” by force?  Alternatively, does The Coy Lover indicate the potential for 
new and creative sonic consequences to follow from unexpected, 
“bastardized” technological couplings in line with Deleuze’s remarks on the 
reciprocal processes of “becoming” involved in the coupling of a wasp and an 
orchid?17  Further, might this work be an allegory of Hume’s problem of 
induction?  That is, might it only be the “constant conjunction” of the starting 
of the snow machine and the pianola’s playing that leads us to posit a causal 
connection between the two?18
 
    
Figure 3.  The Coy Lover (T. Lauschmann, 2011) 
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Questions like these should of course remain open and unresolved in 
favor of the work’s interpretative richness.  However, this brief consideration 
of Lauschmann’s work suggests that the gesture of “figuring” plays a key role 
in his practice, wresting technological entities from the ground to which the 
inattentiveness of common sense (“doxa”) consigns them.  His gesture of 
figuring is “para-doxical” in that it works against the inattentiveness which he 
calls the “accepted everyday.”  Contemporary common sense, perhaps driven 
by consumerism, dictates that the non-specialist should be attentive only to 
the light emitted by a streetlamp, the result of a signal transmitted by a cable, 
or the tune emitted by an instrument and forego critical attention to the 
technologies that render such “content” possible.  In response, Lauschmann 
creates “anti-environments” that suspend, invert, and perturb 
commonsensical expectations.  To further follow through on the implications 
of McLuhan’s remarks on the “anti-environment,” this may place Lauschmann 
as well other artists like him within a broader aesthetic process of “retraining 
and updating” contemporary sensibility. 19
 
 
2. Before the revolution.  Merleau-Ponty  
 
In his 2011 work Before the Revolution, Lauschmann sets a blurred background 
image of Géricault’s 1821 painting The Derby at Epsom against a foreground of 
circling dots.  The dots form a symbol familiar to users of Netflix, YouTube, 
and other sites as the “busy icon” or “processing icon” that dominates the 
screen while images are loading.20
Before the Revolution is a work that is true to its title in at least two senses, 
depending on whether one apprehends the painting or the icon as “figure.”  
Suppose we take Géricault’s painting to be the figure.  This will put us “before 
the revolution” in a temporal sense:  we will be presented with a painting 
from before the “revolution” in image-making brought about by photography.  
Alternatively, the icon emerges as figure.  This will put us “before the 
revolution” in a spatial sense:  face to face with an example of the profound 
  As in Self-Portrait as a Pataphysical Object, it 
is possible to see a reversible relation of figuring at work between the 
painting and the icon.   
On Technological Ground 
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Figure 4.  Before the Revolution (T. Lauschmann, 2011) 
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success of the photographic revolution — namely, Lauschmann’s artwork.  
The icon is a technologically produced image which our conventional 
narrative of technological development — advancing through the stages 
called “television,” “computing,” and “the Internet” — places in a direct lineage 
with what we have called the “photographic revolution.”  Moreover, no matter 
how we encounter the work — online, in a magazine or journal, or on the LCD 
TV that Lauschmann uses in the gallery — we always encounter it through 
media that descend from the revolution in technologically mediated image-
making brought about by photography, which therefore bear the traces of 
photography’s ways of seeing and reproducing images.21
Géricault’s painting is often cited in connection with Eadweard 
Muybridge’s 1878 photographic series The Horse in Motion, which 
demonstrated the painting to be anatomically absurd.  As this well-known 
story goes, Géricault had, in accordance with the established artistic 
convention of his time, depicted horses in a “flying gallop” with front and hind 
legs splayed when all four leave the ground.  Muybridge’s photographs 
demonstrated that no horse ever assumes this position; rather, galloping 
horses have all four legs compressed underneath the body when they leave 
the ground.
  
22
 
  Merleau-Ponty proposes a paradoxical reading of this story: 
Why does [Muybridge’s] horse photographed at the instant where it does not 
touch the ground … have the appearance of jumping on the spot?  And why, in 
contrast, are Géricault’s horses running on the canvas, in a pose that no 
galloping horse has ever had? … Rodin has a profound remark here:  “It is the 
artist who is true and it is the photograph which lies, because, in reality, time 
does not stop.”23
 
  
The problem facing all photography, as Merleau-Ponty implies, is that it can 
only capture movement by evacuating it from the scene.  Thus instead of 
rendering the dynamism of a galloping horse, Muybridge’s photographs may 
appear to depict a horse jumping vertically on the spot.  Although 
anatomically correct, these photographs may be dynamically absurd.  In 
contrast, Géricault’s horses may not render anatomical exactitude, but they 
do render the forward dynamism of a horse in full gallop.   
Merleau-Ponty’s remarks demonstrate painting’s capacity to envisage 
differently, critically, and creatively:  by questioning the received narrative’s 
presupposition that photography’s powers of representation are inherently 
superior to those of the painter, Merleau-Ponty invites reconsideration not 
just of Géricault’s painting but of photography’s role in shaping our 
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contemporary common sense of what it is to see.  In this sense Merleau-
Ponty’s remarks parallel Lauschmann’s “anti-environments.”  With a work like 
“Misshapen Pearl,” Lauschmann creates an anti-environment that invites 
reflection on how contemporary common sense relegates technologies to the 
“ground” of everyday existence.  With his remarks on Géricault, Merleau-
Ponty invites reflection on how the photographic revolution altered the 
common sense of what it was to see — an alteration that we commonly take 
for granted.  Since the photographic revolution, Géricault’s “flying gallop” 
appears paradoxical because it goes against this common sense; before the 
revolution, however, it was conventional, a different “common sense” of things.  
 
3. “The environment announces itself afresh.”  Heidegger  
 
As we have seen, Lauschmann seeks to sidestep “the tension that exists 
between optimistic and skeptical attitudes towards technology.”24  In contrast, 
Heidegger’s account of the human relationship with technology is often 
perceived as deeply pessimistic and essentialist to the point of fatalism.25  On 
closer inspection, however, it may be that Heidegger sought to articulate not 
a fateful relationship to technology but a “free” one in which art and 
technology “belong together.”26
Let us revisit Before the Revolution.  On a Heideggerian reading, it is not 
Géricault’s painting or the icon that is the proper “figure” for this piece but 
rather the relationship between them.  This is because this relationship, while 
always remaining to some degree “hidden” or “concealed,” sets the conditions 
under which the elements of the piece are constrained to reveal themselves.  
It therefore provides a neat (perhaps “schematic”) exemplification of what 
Heidegger calls “alētheia” — the conditions of truth under which beings are 
revealed.
  Perhaps what makes Heidegger’s approach 
appear fatalistic is its lack of “affective critique” — which Lauschmann’s work, 
in contrast, achieves in abundance.  
27  In Heidegger’s account, there are many different modes of 
alētheia.28  The two most important in the context of his remarks on 
technology are poēisis and “enframing” (Gestell).  By poēisis, Heidegger means 
art’s way of revealing — a “bringing forth of the true into the beautiful.”29  If 
Géricault was aiming at the dynamism of a horse in motion in The Derby at 
Epsom, then the painting is an instance of poēisis in Heidegger’s sense, for it 
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attempts to depict a truth about galloping horses using the conventions 
available to the painter.  
By “enframing,” in contrast, Heidegger means modern technology’s 
way of revealing — a “challenging forth” which reveals entities to be available 
and controllable as “resources.”30
For Heidegger, enframing is the dominant way of revealing at work in 
the modern, technology-dependent world.  As the dominant way of 
revealing, enframing tends to conceal other ways, including poēisis.  On a 
Heideggerian interpretation, this is the problem which Before the Revolution 
dramatically depicts:  insofar as the busy icon is positioned over Géricault’s 
painting, it seems to demand that viewers evaluate the painting not as poēisis 
but as enframing.  
  Consider the conditions of revealing that 
give rise to a busy icon:  filmic content must be available to watch quickly and 
repeatedly; users must appear to be regularly updated on the status of the 
content; and this content should be susceptible to control (e.g., fast-
forwarded).  To the extent that the busy icon symbolizes these conditions, it 
instantiates enframing.   
Thus Lauschmann’s work speaks to the key claim of Heidegger’s 
reflections on technology:  enframing is both dependent on poēisis and 
committed to concealing and forgetting it.31  Enframing depends upon poēisis 
as the creative source for the “resources” on which enframing seizes.32
The point is not to reduce Lauschmann’s work to the (vexed and 
politically contentious) terms of a Heideggerian interpretation but simply to 
point out that Heidegger’s philosophy of technology explores something 
which connects with Lauschmann’s work:  the sense in which art and 
technology can be viewed as related forces.  For Heidegger, this dynamic of 
“belonging together” rests on a tension:  the fact that art (poēisis) and 
technology (enframing) are ways of revealing which are at once 
complementary (insofar as they are correlated ways of revealing) and 
opposed (insofar as they are ways of revealing guided by different values).  
The question then arises:  how might Lauschmann’s work be said to 
“affectively critique” these Heideggerian relations?  However onerous the 
demands of enframing, there is a fundamental sense in which poēisis remains 
irreducible to them.  Before the Revolution makes this dramatically vivid by 
confronting the symbol of a downloading image with an image that never 
 
However, enframing cannot tolerate the fundamentally unpredictable nature 
of poēisis.   
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loads:  the painting will not be moved by the symbol in any sense.  Thus the 
symbol emerges not as a manifestation of technological progress — in 
Heidegger’s terms, of enframing’s dominance over poēisis — but of 
technology breaking down and malfunctioning.  
Lauschmann introduced us to the theme of technological 
malfunction in his opening remarks to “Misshapen Pearl,” cited above:  “What 
is a streetlamp?  I only pay her my attention if she bugs me, or if her light is 
too intense, or defective, or missing.”  Consider Heidegger’s famous 
description of what happens when a tool is paradoxically “found missing”:  
 
[W]hen something … is found missing, though its everyday presence has been 
so obvious that we have never taken any notice of it, this makes a break … [We 
come] up against emptiness, and now [see] for the first time what the missing 
article was ready-to-hand with, and what it was ready-to-hand for.  The 
environment announces itself afresh.33
 
  
What Heidegger means by “ready-to-hand” (Zuhanden) is the sense in which a 
tool through use comes to be intuitively depended upon to fulfill its user’s 
intentions:  the sense in which a keyboard is depended upon for touch typing.  
When such a tool breaks or cannot be found, it is no longer “ready-to-hand,”34 
ceases to be dependable, and instead announces “independence” from the 
user.35
An “independent” tool forces its environment to “announce itself 
afresh.”  When a tool is “ready-to-hand,” it is part of the “ground” of the user’s 
experience.  When a tool becomes “un-ready-to-hand,” however, it emerges as 
a “figure” of attention.  Furthermore, the lost or broken tool throws the user’s 
attention back into the total environment from which the tool came; the user 
must think through how the tool’s “un-readiness-to-hand” might be resolved 
and its “environmental” implications, such as what affordances the 
surrounding environment offers and whether some of these may be more 
sustainable than others.  
    
Before the Revolution provokes its viewers to think through the 
implications of a busy icon becoming “un-ready-to-hand.”  Many petty 
frustrations tend to follow such an experience:  impatience with the clip that 
is taking so long to load, the desire to seek another link, or annoyance with 
the user who uploaded the content.  The point, however, is that such 
frustrations may not be merely “petty.”  Rather, they belong to a more general 
species of contemporary everyday experience:  the sense of alienation that 
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slow, complex, and unresponsive technologies can engender in users.  In this 
sense, superficial experiences with technologies turn out to be linked to more 
profound mutations in the environments we inhabit today, concerning 
alienation, reliance, and the perceived limits of control.  This, I think, is a point 
that both Lauschmann and Heidegger could endorse; however, it is arguable 
that Lauschmann takes us further in exploring its implications.  
Consider Lauschmann’s 2009 work He’s Got the Whole World in His 
Hands.36
A biro pen — as a straightforward and relatively cheaply produced 
artefact — stands for the environment of low-tech tools.  A notebook 
computer — as a relatively complex and expensive item — stands for the 
environment of high-tech consumer goods.  He’s Got the Whole World in His 
Hands provokes us to reflect on what separates and relates these 
environments in the contemporary world and on the contrasting implications 
that follow from low- and high-tech technologies breaking down.  
  As an installation involving a notebook computer with a biro pen 
violently forced through the screen, this is so stark a dramatization of user 
frustration that the tendency of viewers may be to forget that it is an artwork 
at all.  Instead of asking questions that go down established aesthetic paths 
(What does it mean?  How is it constructed?  What affect does it produce?), 
such viewers might be compelled to ask:  What could have driven the user to 
it?  This question raises important distinctions between the types of 
technologically mediated environments we inhabit today. 
If a pen runs out of ink, breaks, or cannot be found, the user’s 
environment will, as Heidegger puts it, “announce itself afresh.”  This occurs 
because the user will have to seek out new affordances within the 
environment in order to complete the task in which the pen was implicated.  
If a computer becomes “un-ready-to-hand,” however, this does not seem to 
cause an environment to “announce itself” in anything like Heidegger’s sense.  
This is because rather than constituting an affordance within an 
environment, the computer may seem to more readily constitute an 
environment apart, offering affordances of its own.  In this sense, the “un-
readiness-to-hand” of the computer seems to announce a split between at 
least two environments.  
By violently staging a collision that forces a pen and a computer to 
become simultaneously “un-ready-to-hand,” He’s Got the Whole World in His 
Hands functions as an “affective” critique of the tendency to conflate disparate 
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Figure 5.  He’s Got the Whole World in His Hands  (T. Lauschmann, 2009) 
 
technologies under the banner of “Technology” or “enframing” in Heidegger’s 
approach.37  Lauschmann invites us to reflect that while it is relatively 
apparent to the average user of a pen how it might be repaired, replaced, or 
foregone, these issues become more complex in the case of a computer.  One 
reason why a computer’s breakdown seems to announce a split between our 
mode of Being-in-the-world and that of technology is that the average user is 
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more likely to perceive the computer as a “black box” whose inner workings 
exceed their control.  Reflecting further, we recognize that the split also has to 
do with the user’s perception of the environments to which the technologies 
are linked:  a pen is, according to the contemporary common sense of things, 
a member of the world of “mere things”; a notebook computer, especially 
since the growth of the Internet, is a perceived portal into other worlds.  The 
computer’s breakdown seems to take these worlds away.  
He’s Got the Whole World in His Hands provokes critical reflection on this 
common sense of things.  That the pen can damage the computer reminds us 
that even in a world where computers seem to act as portals into other 
worlds, there is at least one important sense in which they are still fragile 
members of the world of things.  On the other hand, we may be highly 
familiar with the cliché that “the pen is mightier than the sword,” but here it is 
as though the pen were reminding us that there is at least one sense in which 
it is also mightier than the computer.  Such a figurative reading is contrived, 
but the mere fact that it is possible demonstrates that there is at least one 
sense in which there may be more to a pen than our contemporary common 
sense of things will readily admit. 
We may therefore speculate that what might “have driven the user to 
it” is a sense of widening gaps between the low-tech and the high-tech, 
“things” and the environments opened up by computing or the relative 
skillsets of the user and the computer.  Throughout his work, Lauschmann 
displays an acute, critical, and playful awareness of such gaps, using affects to 
critique Heideggerian concepts.  
 
Figure 6.  Wunst (T. Lauschmann, 2004) 
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In the 2004 performance piece Wunst, for example, Lauschmann 
presented his audience with a series of musical instruments upon which they 
were invited to perform together without concern for the gaps between their 
abilities.38  For the 2007 installation Piecework Orchestra, he programmed forty 
household devices — from electric drills and sanders to hedge trimmers and 
vacuum cleaners — to play his composition “Comfort Killed the Cat.”  Here, 
gaps were opened and exploited between the technologies and the purposes 
for which the manufacturers intended them.39  For one of the key works 
included in Startle Reaction, a piece entitled Dear Scientist, Please Paint Me, 
visitors were encouraged to use electric light sources to make luminous marks 
upon the wall of the gallery; in many cases, this involved turning 
smartphones into paintbrushes, thus exposing a gap between the complexity 
of the technology and the simplicity and playfulness of the activity.40
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Piecework Orchestra (T. Lauschmann, 2007) 
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Figure 8.  Dear Scientist, Please Paint Me (T. Lauschmann, 2011) 
Of all Lauschmann’s works to date, however, it is perhaps “At the Heart of 
Everything a Row of Holes” that best explores the gaps opened up by 
technologies.  A thirty-minute video performance, premiered at the Glasgow 
Film Theatre in February 2011, it begins by satirizing technophobia.  First, 
Lauschmann’s silhouette appears whereupon a mawkishly desperate voice 
booms the following words from William Gaddis’ posthumously published 
novel Agapē Agape: 
 
That’s what it’s all about — the collapse of everything.  Of meaning.  Of 
language.  Of values.  Of art.  Disorder and dislocation wherever you look.  
Entropy drowning everything in sight.  Entertainment and technology … And 
every four year old with a computer … Where technology came from in the 
first place you see … Like, the pain … Avoiding pain … That’s what this is all 
about, isn’t it?41
 
  
What follows is a journey through the history, the pitfalls, and the potentials 
of the human relationship with technology.  A roving video projector adorns 
the theatre walls, ceiling, and stage with images of mechanical toys, looms, 
and computer printouts.  After six minutes, a computerized voice tells a tale 
from the sixteenth-century Taoist text Lieh-Tzu in which a jealous king 
disassembles an automaton.42 At eight minutes, clinical photographs depict a  
On Technological Ground 
Volume 4 Number 2 (2015)   159   
 
 
Figure 9.  At the Heart of Everything a Row of Holes  (T. Lauschmann, 2010) 
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contorted human face over which key positions from FACS, the “Facial Actions 
Coding System,” are read out.  At eleven minutes, images from Muybridge’s 
1877 Horse and Cart series appear, accompanied by a voiceover from Alexandre 
Koyré’s 1950 text The Significance of the Newtonian Synthesis.  Towards the end of 
the piece, images projected on a centrally positioned pianola and timed to 
coincide with the striking of its keys reach a crescendo before merging into a 
ball of UFO-like light upon the theatre’s ceiling.  
“At the Heart of Everything” brings together all the key themes 
discussed in this essay:  through manipulation of space, it tends towards the 
creation of an immersive “anti-environment,” where technologies are made to 
emerge as so many “figures” of attention; as with Before the Revolution, 
photography’s impact on our ways of seeing features as a key focus, and 
Muybridge’s horses make an important cameo; in the clash of mechanical 
voices and poetic sounds and imagery, connections with Heidegger’s notions 
of “enframing” and “poēisis” can be made, and new reflections on the theme of 
technology breaking down are provoked, particularly by the Lieh Tzu story. 
If there is something like a pivotal moment in “At the Heart of 
Everything,” however, it occurs roughly halfway through the piece as the 
viewer encounters home-video footage of a small boy circling on a trike:  
bemused, the child doesn’t pedal but simply holds the handlebars so as to 
perpetuate the circling.  A voiceover states:   
 
Entertainment.  That’s where it all started, and that’s where it all ends up.  
Avoiding pain and seeking pleasure.  Play the piano with your feet.  Play the 
piano with your computer.  Play cards.  Press a button.  What else can we do 
when there is [sic] only buttons left?43
 
  
With these words, Lauschmann places two extremes of our contemporary 
relation to technology in a reversible relation of what we have called 
“figuring”:  at the beginning of the work, Gaddis’ hysterical rant against 
technology established an anti-environment where technophobia emerged 
as the figure of attention; now, midway through, the relation is reversed, 
provoking reflection on the opportunities that technologies open up for 
childlike “play.”44  The work seems to invite us to be both extremely aware and 
extremely open in our approach to the specificity of technologies and how 
they contribute to the environments of contemporary everyday experience.  
While the average computer user may not know a great deal about the 
machine’s internal workings, the same can be said of a child on a trike — yet 
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trepidation  need not impede either the child’s or the user’s capacity to 
wonder at or innovate with the technology.  
Conclusion  
A guiding theme for this article has been “paradox” in the etymological sense 
of that which is “against common sense.”  Lauschmann, I have argued, is an 
artist whose practice is paradoxical in this sense insofar as he works against 
our common sense of what technology is and how it influences behavior.  By 
making disparate but highly specific technologies figures of his art, 
Lauschmann removes them from the “ground” of the accepted everyday and 
provokes reflection on the many ways in which they affect human existence.  
In this respect, his art relates to canonical philosophical reflections on 
technology from figures as diverse as McLuhan, Merleau-Ponty, and 
Heidegger.  Like Lauschmann, these thinkers may be implicated in 
paradoxical practices of “figuring” our capacity to reflect critically and 
creatively on the technologies we use and the technologically mediated 
environments we inhabit.  In McLuhan’s case, this involves the “anti-
environment,” a space where our common sense of things is suspended and 
recalibrated.  In Merleau-Ponty’s case, it involves highlighting the dynamic 
ontology of movement to call into question a common sense of things that 
was established by photography.  In Heidegger’s case, it involves the paradox 
of viewing art and technology as fundamentally opposed forces that 
nonetheless “belong together” and the paradox of finding something 
missing.  A broader question to emerge from this essay then might be:  to 
what extent is such a “passion for paradox” emblematic not merely of 
Lauschmann’s work but of “new media art” in general?  To what extent is such 
art a form of affective and enacted critique that takes up and goes beyond the 
concepts generated by philosophical reflections on technology in search of 
the paradoxical in a world of technologically mediated “common sense”?   
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Thanks to Torsten Lauschmann and Dundee Contemporary Arts centre for granting permission 
to use the images featured in this article. All images courtesy of the artist Torsten Lauschmann 
and DCA (www.torstenlauschmann.com; www.dca.org.uk).  
 
1   Torsten Lauschmann, World Jump Day, Accessed July 16, 2015, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Jump_Day. 
2   “Torsten Lauschmann - Biography,” Accessed July 17, 2015, 
http://www.torstenlauschmann.com/#/biography/4548508301. 
3   Sean Cubitt, “Noise, Luck,” in Startle, eds. Torsten Lauschmann and David Bellingham. 
(Dundee: Dundee Contemporary Arts & Film and Video Umbrella, 2012), 38-40; Esther Leslie, 
“Luminescence,” in Startle, eds. Torsten Lauschmann and David Bellingham. (Dundee: 
Dundee Contemporary Arts & Film and Video Umbrella, 2012), 51-52.  
4   “Paradox, n. and adj.,” Accessed July 16, 2015, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/137353?rskey=iwUKjn&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid. The 
OED provides the following etymology for “paradox”:  “mid 16th century (originally denoting a 
statement contrary to accepted opinion):  via late Latin from Greek paradoxon ‘contrary 
(opinion)’, neuter adjective used as a noun, from para- ‘distinct from’ + doxa ‘opinion.’” This 
essay will work with this etymological sense of paradox as opposed to more formal senses of 
paradox operative in contemporary formal logic (on this distinction, see “Paradoxes and 
Contemporary Logic,” Accessed July 17, 2015, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradoxes-
contemporary-logic/).  
5   “Philosophy of technology” is a growing but somewhat inchoate and diverse field of 
contemporary research. An inexhaustive list of approaches currently ranged under the 
heading in diverse ways would include: (1) Heideggerian and hermeneutical approaches (see, 
for example, Borgmann’s Technology and the Character of Everyday Life, or Stiegler’s Technics and 
Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus); (2) “post-phenomenology” (see Ihde’s Technics and Praxis: A 
Philosophy of Technology); (3) “Object Oriented Ontology” (see Harman’s Guerrilla Metaphysics); 
(4) contemporary McLuhanism (see Hayles’ How We Think, or Van den Eede’s Amor 
Technologiae : Marshall McLuhan as Philosopher of Technology); (5) social constructivism (see 
Winner’s The Whale and the Reactor); (6) Foucauldianism (see, for example, Poster’s Information 
Please); (7) “Critical Theory of Technology” (see Feenberg’s Transforming Technology); (8) “Actor 
Network Theory” (see, for example, Latour’s Reassembling the Social); (9) “Cyborg Theory” (see 
Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto”); (10) the Dutch “empirical” school (see Achterhuis’ American 
Philosophy of Technology or Verbeek’s Moralizing Technology); (11) “Extended Mind Thesis” (see, 
for example, Clark’s Supersizing the Mind); and (12) “Philosophy of Information” (see Floridi’s 
The Philosophy of Information). Without attempting to reduce any of the developing branches 
of contemporary philosophy of technology to any of the others, my aim is to examine three 
historical figures whose work relates to themes shared by several of the branches: McLuhan, 
for example, addressed themes of mediation and cognitive “extension”; Merleau-Ponty 
discussed embodiment and perception; Heidegger, interestingly, tends to surface across the 
branches of contemporary philosophy of technology as a figure who is emblematic of a 
problematic form of essentialist or “transcendental” philosophy of technology.  
Contemporary approaches are almost unanimously critical of Heidegger’s approach in favor 
of more nuanced and case-specific “empirical” considerations of specific artefacts in action 
(see, for example, Verbeek’s Moralizing Technology).    
On Technological Ground 
Volume 4 Number 2 (2015)   163   
 
6   Torsten Lauschmann: Startle Reaction, Saturday 22 October 2011 - Sunday 8 January 2012, Accessed 
July 16, 2015, http://dca.whitespacers.com/uploads/Torsten-Lauschmann-Gallery-
Leaflet.pdf. 
7   Ibid.  
8   Marshall McLuhan and Eric McLuhan, Laws of Media (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1988), 5. Emphasis added.  
9   Compare, for example, McLuhan’s remarks here with Ihde’s remarks on the “variants” and 
“invariants” of perception (Don Ihde, Experimental Phenomenology: Multistabilities [New York: 
SUNY Press, 2012], 15-34), and with Husserl’s remarks on “Intentionality as the Main 
Phenomenological Theme” (Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure 
Phenomenology, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson [London and New York: Routledge, 2012], 170-174).  
10  Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media (London: Routledge, 1987), 7-21.  
11   Torsten Lauschmann, “Misshapen Pearl,” Single Screen Video, 8:33, 2003, Accessed July 20, 
2015, http://torstenlauschmann.com/#/misshapen-pearl-2003/4550473187.  
12   Torsten Lauschmann: Startle Reaction. See also Neil Mullholland, “Reel 2 Real Cacophony: 
United Artists’ Twenty-First Century Pictures,” in Scottish Cinema Now, ed. Jonathan Murray, 
Fidelma Farley, and Rod Stoneman (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), 20-
39. 
13   Torsten Lauschmann: Startle Reaction.  
14   Torsten Lauschmann, Self-Portrait as a Pataphysical Object, Accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://www.torstenlauschmann.com/#/self-portrait-as-a-pataphysica/4551080050.  
15   Moira Jeffrey, “Art Review: Torsten Lauschmann: Startle Reaction, Dundee Contemporary 
Arts,” The Scotsman, Nov. 1, 2011, Accessed July 16, 2015, 
http://m.scotsman.com/lifestyle/visual-
arts/art_review_torsten_lauschmann_startle_reaction_dundee_contemporary_arts_1_1939
130. For a discussion of “pataphysics,” as derived from the French absurdist Alfred Jarry, see 
Gilles Deleuze, “An Unrecognized Precursor to Heidegger: Alfred Jarry,” in Essays Critical and 
Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (London: Verso, 1998), 91-98.  
16   Torsten Lauschmann, The Coy Lover, Yamaha Disklavier, Snow Machine, Control Software, 
Spotlight, 1:13, 2011, Accessed July 20, 2015, http://torstenlauschmann.com/#/the-coy-lover-
2011/4558035156. 
17   See Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues II, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 7.   
18   See David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Eric Steinberg 
(Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1993), 50-55. Another of Lauschmann’s works, “Dead 
Man’s Switch” (2008) plays on  the problem of induction in more obvious ways that recall 
the inventions of Descartes’ followers on the so-called “Two Clocks” thesis of causal 
interaction (see Torsten Lauschmann, “Dead Man’s Switch,” Video projection, light 
switching, hard/software, 2008, Accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://www.torstenlauschmann.com/#/dead-mans-switch-2008/4549566659, and Bertrand 
Russell, The History of Western Philosophy [London: Routledge, 2004], 533.) 
19   I have in mind here principally new media and net artists, from the established (see, for 
example, Mark Amerika, Accessed July 20, 2015, http://markamerika.com/; Maurizio 
Bolognini, Accessed July 20, 2015, http://www.bolognini.org/; and Thomson & Craighead, 
Accessed July 20, 2015, http://thomson-craighead.net/) through to the emergent (see, for 
Dominic Smith 
164  Evental Aesthetics    
 
example, the work of Gregory Chatonsky, Accessed July 20, 2015, http://chatonsky.net/; 
Maja Petric, Accessed July 20, 2015, http://www.majapetric.com/; and Petra Cortright, 
Accessed July 20, 2015, http://www.petracortright.com/hello.html). 
20 Torsten Lauschmann, Before the Revolution, Monitor video (two minute loop), 0:34, Accessed 
July 20, 2011, http://torstenlauschmann.com/#/before-the-revolution-2011/4558035715.  
21   For the canonical contemporary discussion of (and challenge to) the simplifications of the 
conventional “lineage” narrative involved here, see Vilém Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of 
Photography, trans. Anthony Mathews (London: Reaktion Books, 2000).   
22   For discussions of these received interpretations, see, for example, Arthur C. Danto, “The 
Naked Truth,” in Photography and Philosophy: Essays on the Pencil of Nature, ed. Scott Walden. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2010), 229, and Aaron Scharf, Art and Photography (London: The Penguin 
Press, 1969), 170-175.   
23   Maurice Merleau-Ponty, L’Oeil et l’Esprit (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1999), 80. My translation. 
24   Torsten Lauschmann: Startle Reaction. 
25   See, for example, Andrew Feenberg, Transforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 8. 
26   Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 3. 
27   Ibid., 12.  
28   See, for example, Jeff Malpas, Heidegger and the Thinking of Place: Explorations in the Topology of 
Being (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012), 330-331.  
29   Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 34.  
30   Ibid., 19-22.  
31   Ibid., 27.  
32   See Ibid., 34. Heidegger famously takes Enframing’s dependency on poēisis to be signaled by 
the fact that the ancient Greeks did not distinguish between “art” and “technology” but 
instead referred to both as forms of technē. See also Martin Heidegger, “Traditional 
Language and Technological Language,” trans. Wanda Torres Gregory, Journal of 
Philosophical Research Vol. XXIII (1998): 129-145.  
33   Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2005), 105.  
34   See Heidegger, Being and Time, 102-107. Heidegger calls the modes of being in which a tool 
exerts its independence “conspicuousness,” “obtrusiveness,” and “obstinacy.”  
35   The traditional interpretation of this dynamic has been anthropocentric (or rather “Dasein”-
centric) insofar as it has emphasized the tendency of the broken tool to enjoy a kind of 
negative liberty (“independence from” human intentions). In contrast, recent “realist” 
developments in continental philosophy have, we might say, emphasized a form of 
“positive liberty” for the object (that is, “independence to” be other than constituted by 
human intentions). See Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects 
(Peru, Illinois: Open Court, 2002), and Ian Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, or What It’s Like to be a 
Thing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012).   
36   Torsten Lauschmann, He’s Got the Whole World in His Hands, Laptop, Biro Pen, Tuvan Throat 
Singing Soundtrack, 1:01, 2009, Accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://torstenlauschmann.com/#/hes-got-the-whole-world-in/4549784259. 
On Technological Ground 
Volume 4 Number 2 (2015)   165   
 
37   By drawing attention to this split in a violent way, He’s Got the Whole World in His Hands might 
also be read as implying a critique of the political “destinies” towards which such 
Heideggerian holism might stand to lead us. This is particularly important in the wake of 
the recent “Black Notebooks” controversy surrounding Heidegger (see Karl Löwith, Martin 
Heidegger and European Nihilism, trans. Gary Steiner (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1995), and Peter E. Gordon, “Heidegger in the Black,” Accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/oct/09/heidegger-in-black/).  
38   Torsten Lauschmann, Wunst, Performance, Glasgow Transmission Gallery, 5:23, 2004, 
Accessed July 20, 2015, http://torstenlauschmann.com/#/wunst-2004/4549785645. 
39   Torsten Lauschmann, Piecework Orchestra, 40 Computer Controlled Machines, Dimensions 
Variable, 4:56, 2007, Accessed July 20, 2015, http://torstenlauschmann.com/#/piecework-
orchestra-2007/4549785112. 
40  Torsten Lauschmann, Dear Scientist, Please Paint Me, Moving Head Light, Luminace Paint, 
Control Software, Speakers, 2:30, 2011, Accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://torstenlauschmann.com/#/dear-scientist-please-paint-me/4558034730. 
41   Torsten Lauschmann, “At the Heart of Everything a Row of Holes,” Moving Head Video 
Projection, Player Piano (midi), 26:32, 2011, Accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://torstenlauschmann.com/#/at-the-heart-of-everything/4550244141.  
42   Eva Wong, Lieh-Tzu: A Taoist Guide to Practical Living, trans. Eva Wong (Boston: Shambhala 
Publications, 1995).  
43   Ibid.  
44   In connection with this, see Sicart’s recent work on play and video games (Miguel Sicart, 
Play Matters (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2014), 93-101). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dominic Smith 
166  Evental Aesthetics    
 
References 
 
 
Achterhuis, Hans, ed.  American Philosophy of Technology: The Empirical Turn. 
Translated by R.P. Crease.  Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2001. 
Amerika, Mark.  “Artist’s Website.”  Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://markamerika.com/.  
Benjamin, Walter.  “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” 
In Illuminations, translated by Harry Zohn, edited by Hannah Arendt, 
211-245.  London: Pimlico, 1999. 
——.  The Arcades Project.  Translated by Howard Eiland & Kevin McLaughlin.  
London: The Belknap of Harvard University Press, 2002.  
Bogost, Ian.  Alien Phenomenology, or What It’s Like to be a Thing.  Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2012.   
Bolognini Maurizio.  “Artist’s Website.”  Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://www.bolognini.org/.  
Borgmann, Albert.  Technology and the Character of Everyday Life.  Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984.  
Cantini, Andrea.  “Paradoxes and Contemporary Logic.”  Fall 2014.  Accessed 
July 17, 2015.  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradoxes-
contemporary-logic/. 
Chatonsky, Gregory.  “Artist’s Website.” Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://chatonsky.net/.  
Clark, Andy.  Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action and Cognitive Extension. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Cortright, Petra.  “Artist’s Website.”  Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://www.petracortright.com/hello.html. 
Crary, Jonathan.  24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep.  London: Verso, 2013.  
Danto, Arthur C.  “The Naked Truth.”  In Photography and Philosophy: Essays on 
the Pencil of Nature, edited by Scott Walden, 284-309.  Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2010.  
On Technological Ground 
Volume 4 Number 2 (2015)   167   
 
Deleuze, Gilles.  Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation.  Translated by Daniel W. 
Smith. London: Continuum, 2005. 
Deleuze, Gilles and Claire Parnet.  Dialogues II.  Translated by Hugh Tomlinson 
and Barbara Habberjam.  New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.  
Feenberg, Andrew.  Transforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002. 
Flusser, Vilém.  Towards a Philosophy of Photography.  Translated by Anthony 
Mathews. London: Reaktion Books, 2000.   
Gaddis, William.  Agapē Agape.  London: Atlantic Books, 2003.  
Gordon, Peter E.  “Heidegger in the Black.”  Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/oct/09/heidegger-in-
black/.  
Harman, Graham.  Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects.  Peru, 
Illinois: Open Court, 2002.  
——.  Guerilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things.  Peru, 
Illinois: Open Court, 2007.   
Hayles, N. Katherine.  How We Think: Digital Media and Contemporary 
Technogenesis.  London: University of Chicago Press, 2012.  
Heidegger, Martin.  Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarie and Edward 
Robinson.  Oxford: Blackwell, 2005. 
——.  “The Question Concerning Technology.”  In The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays.  Translated by William Lovitt, 3-36.  New 
York: Harper Row, 1977. 
——.  “Traditional Language and Technological Language.”  Translated by 
Wanda Torres Gregory.  Journal of Philosophical Research Vol. XXIII 
(1998): 129-145.  
Hume, David.  An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.  Edited by Eric 
Steinberg.  Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1993. 
Husserl, Edmund.  Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology.  
Translated by W.R. Boyce Gibson.  London: Routledge, 2012. 
Ihde, Don.  Technics and Praxis: A Philosophy of Technology.  Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 
1979.  
Dominic Smith 
168  Evental Aesthetics    
 
——.  Experimental Phenomenology: Multistabilities.  New York: SUNY Press, 
2012.  
Jeffrey, Moira.  “Art Review: Torsten Lauschmann: Startle Reaction, Dundee 
Contemporary Arts.” The Scotsman.  Nov. 1, 2011.  Accessed July 16, 2015. 
http://m.scotsman.com/lifestyle/visual-
arts/art_review_torsten_lauschmann_startle_reaction_dundee_conte
mporary_arts_1_1939130. 
Latour, Bruno.  Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.  
Lauschmann, Torsten.  “Misshapen Pearl.”  Single Screen Video, 8:33.  2003. 
Accessed July 20, 2015.  http://torstenlauschmann.com/#/misshapen-
pearl-2003/4550473187. 
——.  Wunst.  Performance, Glasgow Transmission Gallery, 5:23.  2004. 
http://torstenlauschmann.com/#/wunst-2004/4549785645. 
——.  Self-Portrait as a Pataphysical Object.  2006.  Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://www.torstenlauschmann.com/#/self-portrait-as-a-
pataphysica/4551080050.  
——.  Piecework Orchestra.  40 Computer Controlled Machines, Dimensions 
Variable, 4:56. 2007.  Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://torstenlauschmann.com/#/piecework-orchestra-
2007/4549785112. 
——.  He’s Got the Whole World in His Hands.  Laptop, Biro Pen, Tuvan Throat 
Singing Soundtrack, 1:01. 2009.  Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://torstenlauschmann.com/#/hes-got-the-whole-world-
in/4549784259. 
——.  “At the Heart of Everything a Row of Holes.”  Moving Head Video 
Projection, Player Piano (midi), 26:32. 2011.  Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://torstenlauschmann.com/#/at-the-heart-of-
everything/4550244141. 
——.  The Coy Lover.  Yamaha Disklavier, Snow Machine, Control Software, 
Spotlight, 1:13. 2011.  Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://torstenlauschmann.com/#/the-coy-lover-2011/4558035156. 
——.  Dear Scientist, Please Paint Me.  Moving Head Light, Luminace Paint, 
Control Software, Speakers, 2:30.  2011.  Accessed July 20, 2015. 
On Technological Ground 
Volume 4 Number 2 (2015)   169   
 
http://torstenlauschmann.com/#/dear-scientist-please-paint-
me/4558034730. 
——.  Startle Reaction, Saturday 22 October 2011 - Sunday 8 January 2012. 
Accessed July 16, 2015.  http://dca.whitespacers.com/uploads/Torsten-
Lauschmann-Gallery-Leaflet.pdf. 
——.  and David Bellingham, eds.  Startle.  Dundee: Dundee Contemporary 
Arts & Film and Video Umbrella, 2012.   
——.  World Jump Day.  Accessed July 16, 2015. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Jump_Day. 
Löwith, Karl.  Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism.  Translated by Gary 
Steiner. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.   
Malpas, Jeff.  Heidegger and the Thinking of Place: Explorations in the Topology of 
Being.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012. 
McLuhan, Marshall.  Understanding Media.  London: Routledge, 1987. 
——.  and Eric McLuhan.  Laws of Media.  Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1988. 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice.  L’Oeil et l’esprit.  Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1999. 
Mulholland, Neil.  “Reel 2 Real Cacophony: United Artists’ Twenty-First 
Century Pictures.”  In Scottish Cinema Now, edited by Jonathan Murray, 
Fidelma Farley, and Rod Stoneman, 20-39.  Newcastle: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2009.  
OED.  “Paradox, n. and adj.”  June 2015.  Accessed July 16, 2015. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/137353?rskey=iwUKjn&result=1&isA
dvanced=false#eid. 
Petric, Maja.  “Artist’s Website.”  Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://www.majapetric.com/.  
Poster, Mark.  Information Please: Culture and Politics in the Age of Digital 
Machines.  Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2006. 
Russell, Bertrand.  The History of Western Philosophy.  London: Routledge, 2004.  
Scharf, Aaron.  Art and Photography.  London: Penguin, 1969. 
Sicart, Miguel.  Play Matters.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014.  
Dominic Smith 
170  Evental Aesthetics    
 
Stiegler, Bernard.  Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus.  Translated by 
Richard Beardsworth and George Collins.  Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998. 
Thomson, Jon and Alison Craighead.  “Artists’ Website.”  Accessed July 20, 
2015. http://thomson-craighead.net/. 
Van den Eede, Yoni.  Amor Technologiae: Marshall McLuhan as Philosopher of 
Technology.  Brussels: VUB Press, 2013.  
Verbeek, Peter Paul.  Moralizing Technology: Understanding and Designing the 
Morality of Things.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011. 
Winner, Langdon.  The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High 
Technology.  Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986. 
Wong, Eva.  Lieh-Tzu: A Taoist Guide to Practical Living. Boston: Shambhala 
Publications, 1995. 
  
